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EXPANDING THE NAFTA CHAPTER 19
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: A WAY
To DECLAW TRADE REMEDY LAWS IN A
FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS?
Stephen J. Powell'
ABSTRACT
Chapter 19 of the NAFTA transfers judicial review of U.S., Canadian,
and Mexican government investigations under the controversial anti-dump-
ing and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws from national courts to bina-
tional panels of private international law experts. The system stands as a
unique surrender of judicial sovereignty to an international body, a hybrid
of national courts and international dispute settlement with as yet no paral-
lel in the world of international trade or other international law regimes.
Binational panel decisions have been controversial because agencies chafe
at their intimate examination of agency findings and supporting evidence.
Panels also are viewed as substantially more likely to overturn agency con-
clusions than national courts. Given the record of chapter 19 NA ETA
panels, the author examines whether the system created to fill a unique
need among the NAFTA parties may have broader utility, albeit one per-
haps less true to its original purpose.
We will recall that U.S. recalcitrance on proposed changes to its ADI
CVD laws (and its agricultural subsidies) were the principal reasons that
Brazilforced Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) talks onto the back
burner to await the Doha Round results on these issues. The United States
is unlikely to condone major changes to the WTO Anti-Dumping and Sub-
sidies Agreements, which will become the final sticking point for reaching
agreement after members resolve the agriculture issues now blocking con-
clusion of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Thus, trade
remedies will again surface as major issues once FTAA talks resume. Stud-
ies indicate that binational panels reverse agency decisions at a greater rate
than national courts and that existence of the system has reduced the rate of
filing of industry requests for AD/CVD investigations. Rather than finding
an elusive set of substantive revisions to these laws, might changing the
method of review of agency determinations furnish a missing piece in the
1. Lecturer in Law and Director, International Trade Law Program, University of
Florida Levin College of Law; Chief Counsel for Import Administration, U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, 1982-1999. Professor Powell wishes to thank his students,
Reka Toth Beane and Jean Pierre Espinoza, for their excellent research assistance.
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puzzle of FTAA negotiations? Although Brazil's (and other FTAA coun-
tries') officials may at first glance see nothing in a Chapter 19 process that
fails to address their substantive AD/CVD conflicts with the United States
as to orange juice, steel, and other Brazilian exports, further reflection may
reveal that Chapter 19 has demonstrated yet again what good lawyers have
always known, that procedure can become substance in the twinkle of an
eye. In short, more than one way exists to reduce the effect of U.S. AD!
CVD investigations. Improvements would have to be made, including in-
troduction of an automatic and effective right of appeal whose absence ar-
guably undercuts the credibility of the process by awarding enormous
power to panels.
Adoption of a system such as NA ETA 's chapter 19 on a 34-nation basis
not only may ameliorate long-intractable conflicts over trade remedy laws,
implementation of such a system will have substantial positive effects for
civil society in general. Dispute settlement systems promote timeliness, in-
clusive record keeping, and impartiality in the administrative decisional
process. They improve governmental accountability on several levels. By
improving participation of all levels of society in their governance, interna-
tional trade dispute settlement systems strongly promote the rule of law.
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1. INTRODUCTIONMANY commentators have analyzed the innovative approach de-
signed by Canada and the United States in their 1988 free trade
pact for review of anti-dumping and countervailing duty deter-
minations, improved in 1994 when Mexico joined in the creation of the
North American Free Trade Agreement. 2 NAFTFA in fact contains a dif-
ferent dispute resolution structure for virtually every kind of commercial
conflict.
Chapter 11 permits private investors to take the NAFT7A Party hosting
its investment before an arbitral tribunal for issuance of a binding award
if the host has failed to provide fair and equitable treatment or has taken
regulatory measures "tantamount" to expropriation of its reasonable in-
vestor expectations. 3 The financial services chapter interposes additional
procedures for investor disputes that involve financial services, including
mandatory referral to a committee of the Parties' financial ministers for a
ruling on the validity of financial policy defenses.4 Side agreements ad-
dressing the intersection of NAFTFA's trade provisions with the rights of
workers and with efforts of the Parties to protect the environment con-
tain dispute resolution systems special to these subjects.5 These systems
have become ever-strengthening models for ameliorating trade's effects
on these important policies in later U.S. free trade agreements with Chile,
Peru, Colombia, the Central American Common Market, and the Do-
minican Republic.
Chapter 20 provides a general dispute settlement scheme for contro-
versies not addressed by these special procedures. Parties may use Chap-
ter 20 for interpretation, application, or breach of the Agreement,
although they have invoked its procedures only three times in the 12
years of NAFTA's operation. 6 Parties initiated general dispute settle-
2. See, e.g., Stephen J. Powell & Mark A. Barnett, The Role of United States Trade
Laws in Resolving the Florida-Mexico Tomato Conflict, 11 FLA. L. REV. 319, 355
(1997), and Edward D. Re, International Judicial Tribunals and the Courts of the
Americas: A Comment with Emphasis on Human Rights Law, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1091 (1996); and David A.Crantz, Resolution of Trade Disputes Under NAFTA 's
Chapter 19: The Lessons of Extending the Binational Panel Process to Mexico, 29
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 297, 298 (1998).
3. Henri Alvarez, Guided by an In visible Hand: Public Policy under Chapter 11 of
the North American Free Trade Agreement 21 (Guiado, por una Mano Invisible: El
Orden Publico al Amparo del Capitulo 11 del Tratado de Libre Comercio de
Ami~rica del Norte (TLCA N), Revista Peruana de Arbitraje No 1 (2005).
4. NAFTA arts. 1414 & 1415.
5. Chapter 11 has created substantial controversy regarding the potentially conflict-
ing policies of protecting foreign investment and protecting the environment. See,
e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL Jun. 24, 1998, available at http:I/www.
naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/EthylCorp/EthylCorpAwardOnJurisdiction.pdf
and Metalciad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Add'l Fac. No. Arb(AF)/97/
1, Sept 2, 2000, available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Metalclad/
MetalcladFinalAward.pdf (both visited Aug. 12, 2008).
6. Marc Sheer, Chapter 20 Dispute Resolution under NAFTA: Fact or Fiction?, 35
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1001 (2003).
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ment about as often in the pre-NAFTA days of the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement (USCFTA). Each of these systems deserves fuller ex-
ploration, but the specific device this essay treats is NAFTA's means for
resolving anti-dumping and countervailing duty disputes. After briefly
describing Chapter 19's procedures, the essay will discuss the chapter's
effects on the rates of initiation of new AD/CVD investigations and of
review of the resulting agency determinations, problems with the system
that deserve further consideration by the Parties, and the viability of
some version of Chapter 19 as a model for a Hemispheric trade
agreement.
11. UNIQUE FEATURES OF NAFTrA CHAPTER 19
A. ORIGINS
Other negotiators of Chapter 19 have confirmed the useful background
note that the system arose from Canada's desire to eliminate application
to its imports of U.S. trade remedy law, that is, anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing duty determinations. 7 To this end, negotiators inserted a spe-
cial "expiration" date for Chapter 19 of five years after its entry into force
within which time a working group would "seek to develop a substitute
system of rules dealing with unfair pricing and government subsidization"
and report to the parties as to its efforts.8 If Canadian negotiators genu-
inely expected that a special trade remedy regime for their exports would
result from this language, any such hope soon was dashed. The working
group issued no report and, in fact, held no substantive meeting during
those five years. At the end, NAFTFA's special procedures for review of
AD/CVD determinations replaced those of the USCFTFA. 9 The working
group's deliberations, such as they were, terminated in favor of a general
consultations provision without even the encouragement of a hortatory
expiration period.' 0
7. "Trade remedy," "trade defense," and "contingency protection" laws, as they are
called by everyone but the U. S. Government, also refer to escape clause actions
under the WTO Safeguards Agreement or regional trade agreements. NAFTA
Chapter 8, not Chapter 19, addresses safeguards actions. Anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing duty (anti-subsidy) laws are controversial exceptions to the WTO's fun-
damental principle of non-discrimination in government measures affecting trade.
Although the WTO Agreements that impose disciplines on imposition of extra
tariffs for the "unfair" trade actions of dumping (the sale of goods for export at a
price lower than the price for like goods in the home market, or below the cost of
producing the goods) and government subsidies that target certain industries are
detailed, sufficient discretion remains to inspire endless litigation in national courts
and in NAIFTA and WTO dispute settlement. Hundreds of books and article ex-
plain these laws. A useful new text is Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, WORLD
TRADE LAW: TEXT, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY chs. 11-12 (Hart 2008).
8. USCIFTA, arts. 1906 & 1907.
9. Patrick Macrory, NA ETA Chapter 19: A Successful Experiment in International
Trade Dispute Resolution 15 (C.D. Howe Institute No. 168 Sept. 2002) (on file with
author).
10. See NAFTA art. 1907.
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B. REPLACEMENT OF NATIONAL COURTS, BUT NOT NATIONAL LAW
Thus did Chapter 19 become a permanent fixture on the landscape of
Northern Hemispheric trade relations. Indeed, it is a unique surrender of
judicial sovereignty to an international body, a hybrid of national courts
and international dispute settlement with as yet no parallel in the world
of international trade or other international law regimes." Chapter 19's
uniqueness stems both: from its replacement of national courts in the re-
view of AD/CVD determinations of the Parties, and its retention of na-
tional law as the basis for review of such determinations. On one hand,
private companies with standing to challenge an AD/CVD determination
in the national courts may entirely bypass judicial review by selecting
Chapter 19's binational panel system.12 In fact, either side in the agency
determination-domestic industry or foreign producers and importers-
is empowered to divest national courts of jurisdiction. Either as "win-
ners" or "losers" in the agency proceedings, Canadian producers, for ex-
ample, can force binational panel review whether they find themselves as
exporters in a U.S. determination or the domestic industry in a Canadian
proceeding.
On the other hand, although election of Chapter 19 triggers formation
of an international dispute settlement panel, the panel does not apply the
substantive AD/CVD law created by the international treaty provisions
of Chapter 19, because the treaty creates no such law.' 3 Chapter 19 ex-
pressly eschews any hand in changing the laws of the Parties governing
investigation and issuance of AD/CVD determinations.'14 Panel review
extends only to the question "whether such determination was in accor-
dance with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing
Party."' 5 The Panel explicitly stands in the shoes of the national courts of
the importing Party, even to the point of applying the same standard of
review of the agency's AD/CVD determination that such courts would
have applied to the case.16
11. See Macrory, supra note 9, at 16.
12. Id.
13. To protect against a challenge that foreign panelists not appointed by the President
would be exercising "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126, 140-141 (1976), in violation of the Ap-
pointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. 11, sec. 2, cI. 2, the NAFFA incor-
porates national AD/CVD laws of the Parties, present and future. The U.S.
position in the case of such a challenge would be that binational panels are imple-
menting international law. See art. 1904.2 and Statement of Administrative Ac-
tion, H.R. 3450, 103rd Cong., Sec. 101, (1993).
14. Parties reserve the right to retain their existing AD/CVD laws or to change them,
subject to a notice process if the revisions are to apply to investigations involving
goods of other Parties, art. 1902. The Parties have not always observed this re-
quirement, resulting in one case in the embarrassing need to enact special legisla-
tion to apply an amendment to a NAFTA Party and, in another, in one Party's
ignoring an especially egregious revision that excludes sunset reviews from bina-
tional panel challenge. See NAFTA, In the Matter of Caustic Soda from Mexico,
NAFTA Secretariat No. MEX-USA-20i3-1904-1.
15. NAFTA art. 1904.2; see also, NAFFA art. 1902.
16. NAFTA art. 1904.3 and Annex 1911.
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C. PANEL DECISIONS DIRECTLY BINDING ON AGENCIES
Like national courts and, unlike other international dispute settlement
systems, decisions of Chapter 19 panels are directly binding on the na-
tional agencies that issued the determination under review. 17 There is no
intermediate step in which the Government of the Party whose determi-
nation is found wanting must approve the binational panel decision
before it may be implemented, as is the case, for example, in WTO dis-
pute settlement 18 or in the general dispute settlement procedures of
NAFTA Chapter 20.
To ensure the separation of binational panel decisions from national
judicial jurisdiction, parties to Chapter 19 dispute panel decisions may not
appeal to the national courts, nor may national legislatures enact legisla-
tion to overturn those decisions.' 9 The only other international dispute
settlement system to approach this degree of surrender of final judicial
sovereignty is the transnational Court of Justice of the Andean Commu-
nity.20 Even that Court's decisions are obligatory for the Member Coun-
tries only after approval by the Commission of the Andean Community
or its Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations. 21 Certainly, the WTO
procedure carries no such automatic feature, as shown by delay and, in
some cases, defiance by its largest Members.22
111. CHAPTER 19'S EFFECT ON FILING WITHIN NAFTA OF
AD/CVD CASES
With this background, the issue we consider first is whether the dispute
settlement process under Chapter 19 has affected the rate of initiation by
NAFTA Parties of antidumping and countervailing duty cases against im-
ports from other NAFTFA member nations. Some researchers have found
that Chapterl9 has significantly affected U.S. antidumping and counter-
vailing duty activity among its NAFTA partners. 23 One study suggests
that binational panel review may reduce the likelihood that a panel will
uphold an agency finding of material injury and thus indirectly discour-
ages filing of AD/CVD petitions. This study finds data supporting the
view that the early Chapter 19 under USCFTA had an impact on AD
17. NAFTA art. 1904.9.
18. David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 236 (Cambridge 2004).
19. NAFTA arts. 1904.11 & 1903.1(b).
20. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, as amended by
the Cochabamba Protocol, entered into force, 25 Aug 1999, art. 2.
21. Id.
22. For example, the European Union has not even pretended to comply with WTO
dispute settlement rulings that its ban of beef from cattle raised with growth hor-
mones violates the WTO Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures. See EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)
WT/DS26/R/USA, WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1977). See also Chris Wold, San-
ford Gaines & Greg Block, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND POLICY 467
(Carolina Academic Press 2005).
23. See Macrory, supra note 9, at 22.
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filings .24 Specifically, from 1980 to 1988 U.S. industries filed an average
of 2.8 AD cases per year. That figure dropped to 1.6 cases per year after
from 1989 to 1997 under the early Chapter 19.25 The reduction of filings
since the NAFTA took effect may relate to the binational panel review
system's faster review-at least in the early days of the NAFTA. This
swiftness may have decreased any advantage to a domestic petitioner of
filing a case in order to chill trade .26
Further, binational panels have tended to be less deferential to U.S.
government agencies than the federal courts had been. Many studies
have found that binational panels overturn U.S. agency rulings substan-
tially more often than federal courts .27 In addition, the panels apply a
high standard of scrutiny to agency decisions favorable to U.S. petitioners
seeking trade relief, while according almost unchecked deference to
agency decisions adverse to U.S. petitioners.28 In contrast, binational
panels have shown great deference to Canadian agency determinations,
whichever side prevails, 29 admittedly no doubt in part because of Ca-
nada's less onerous standard of review. This disparity may be a reason
that U.S. industries over time have sought fewer AD/CVD trade reme-
dies against Canadian imports. 30
Other researchers have found that Chapter 19 has had little effect on
antidumping and countervailing duty activity. A study based on data
from 1989 to 2000 finds little evidence that NAKI'A Chapter 19 dispute
settlement activity affected the frequency of U.S. AD/CVD filings or af-
firmative determinations against Canada or Mexico. 31 However, this
study does find evidence that cumulative remands by Chapter 19 dispute
panels to review U.S. decisions against Canadian imports have led to
24. Id.
25. Kent Jones, Does NAFTA Chapter 19 Make a Difference? Dispute Settlement and
the Incentive Structure of U.SlCanada Unfair Trade Petitions, 18 CONTEMP. ECON.
POL'Y 145, 152 & 158 (2000).
26. Id. at 150. In my experience, U.S. petitioners, while not above intimidation tactics
altogether (such as the occasional press release grumbling about below-cost pricing
by import rivals), are unlikely actually to file a petition seeking trade remedies
solely to chill trade. Not only is gathering the required data expensive, but they
are likely to find themselves the subject of a Sherman or Clayton Act antitrust
investigation by the Department of Justice. Under the Noerr-I-ennington doctrine,
petitioning one's government for relief is an exception to antitrust prohibitions of
conspiracies and combinations to restrain trade, but the exception does not apply
in the case of a "sham petition." Eastern R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961).
27. Juscelino F. Colares, Alternative Methods of Appellate Review in Trade Remedy
Cases. Examining Results of U.S. Judicial and NA ETA Binational Review of U.S.
Agency Decisions from 1989 to 2005 17 (Syracuse Univ. College of Law, Aug. 18,
2006), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=920144) (visited Aug.
12, 2008).
28. Juscelino F. Colares & John W. Bohn, NAFTA's Double Standards of Review, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 202 (2007).
29. Id. at 202.
30. Cularcs & Bohni, supra notc 28, at 203.
31. Bruce A. Blonigen, The Effects of NA ETA on Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Activity, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 407, 422 (2005).
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fewer new affirmative AD and CVD decisions. 32 Further, the study's
econometric analysis notes that both Canada and Mexico experience
about six fewer U.S. trade remedy cases each year than the rest of the
world.33
The data displayed in Figure 1 shows that AD/CVD initiations between
NAFTA Parties have decreased from the commencement of NAIFA un-
til the present day. Since 1994, the year NAFTFA became effective; there
has been a large reduction in all AD/CVD initiations brought by one
NAFTFA Party against another. For instance, Canadian industries initi-
ated 51 AD/CVD investigations against their U.S. and Mexican competi-
tors from 1985 to 1994, but only initiated 18 from 1995 to 2006. Further,
Mexican industries initiated approximately 65 AD/CVD investigations
against companies of its NAFTA partners from 1985 to 1994, but only
initiated 21 investigations from 1995 to 2006. Similarly, U.S. petitions re-
sulted in 72 AD/CVD investigations against Canadian and Mexican sec-
tors from 1985 to 1994, but only 43 investigations from 1995 to 2006.
Furthermore, the data in Figure 2 reflect a reduction in the number of
cases brought to review for the agency determinations under NAFTA
Chapter 19. During the time of the USCFTA, Canadian industries
brought nineteen challenges against AD/CVD determinations issued by
U.S. authorities, and U.S. industries filed thirty complaints against Cana-
dian agency determinations. These numbers become seventeen and
nineteen respectively within the NAFTA's first seven years. In addition,
this reduction is especially apparent in the last three years, in which U.S
industries filed thirteen petitions against merchandise from NAFTA
countries and experienced five filings against U.S. imports. In contrast,
U.S. industries in the three years from 1998 to 2000 filed twenty-three
cases against goods from its NAFTA partners and had eleven cases filed
against their exports. In summary, NAFFA Chapter 19, to a measurable
degree, has reduced the number of investigations of AD/CVD, initiated
by NAFTA members industries, involving NAFFA merchandise.
Next, we compare the data in Figure 1 with those in Figure 2 to discern
whether Chapter 19 review has reduced AD/CVD investigation request
by NAFTA members industries against one another. The United States,
Canada, and Mexico initiated 115 AD/CVD investigations from 1989 to
1993, of products from one of the other countries. During this same time,
there were 49 Chapter 19 cases brought under USCFTA (Mexico of
course had not yet joined its North American neighbors in the FTA).
From 1994 to 2000, NAFTA members initiated fifty-six AD/CVD investi-
gations against each other's goods and brought sixty-nine Chapter 19
cases. Lastly, from 2000 to 2006, NAFTA members initiated thirty-eight
AD/CVD investigations of one of the other NAFTA Party's goods and
sought forty-five reviews under Chapter 19. The initiation of AD/CVD
cases by NAFTA members against one another has decreased over time.
32. Id.
33. See Blonigen, supra note 31, at 416.
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FIGURE 1
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Initiations
Canada Canada Mexico Mexico us us
Initiation against against against against against against
Date us Mexico us Canada Canada Mexico
1985 7 0 N/A N/A 8 1
1986 7 0 N/A N/A 4 7
1987 3 1 10 0 2 1
1988 6 0 4 0 5 0
1989 2 1 2 0 8 2
1990 3 0 8 0 0 1
1991 4 0 8 0 7 2
1992 10 0 6 0 7 9
1993 5 0 17 4 1 3
'85-'93 TOTAL 47 2 55 4 42 26
1994 2 0 5 1 0 4
1995 4 0 2 0 0 1
1996 2 0 1 0 1 1
1997 1 0 3 0 3 0
1998 0 0 4 0 2 2
1999 2 0 2 0 4 5
2000 2 0 1 0 1 0
'94-'00OTOTAL 13 0 18 1 11 13
2001 1 0 2 0 6 3
2002 0 0 0 0 5 0
2003 1 1 5 0 0 2
2004 1 0 1 0 3 2
2005 1 0 N/A N/A 1 0
2006 2 0 N/A N/A 0 1
"01-'O6 TOTAL 6 1 8 0 15 8
TOTAL 66 3 81 5 68 47
Sources:
(1) Canadian Services Border Agency, Historical Listing, at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-Imsi/
historic-eng.html (visited Aug. 12, 2008).
(2) Chad P. Bown, Global Antidumping Database, Version 1.0 (Working paper No. 3737, The World
Bank 2005), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/externaI/default/main?pagePK=64165259&piPK=
64165421&theSitePK=469372&menuPK-64166093&entitylD=00001640620050930115032 (visited
Aug. 12, 2008).
(3) U.S. International Trade Commission, Office of Investigations, Import Injury Case Statistics (FY
1980-2006), at http://www.usitc.gov/trade-remedy/Report-10-06-PUB.pdf (Oct. 2006) (visited Aug.
12, 2008).
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FIGURE 2
NAFTA Chapter 19 Cases Reviewing Agency Determinations
Canada Canada Mexico Mexico us us
Date against against against against against against
Filed us Mexico us Canada Canada Mexico
1989 1 N/A N/A N/A 11 N/A
1990 1 N/A N/A N/A 3 N/A
1991 2 N/A N/A N/A 5 N/A
1992 2 N/A N/A N/A 6 N/A
1993 13 N/A N/A N/A 5 N/A
'89-'93 TOTAL 19 N/A N/A N/A 30 N/A
1994 4 0 3 0 1 1
1995 4 0 1 0 1 4
1996 1 0 0 3 0 1
1997 1 1 1 0 3 5
1998 3 0 1 0 2 3
1999 0 1 0 0 5 2
2000 4 0 2 0 7 4
'94-00 TOTAL 17 2 8 3 19 20
2001 0 0 0 0 1 5
2002 0 0 1 0 7 3
2003 0 0 2 0 4 2
2004 0 1 0 0 2 1
2005 0 0 1 0 4 2
2006 1 0 2 0 4 2
2007 0 1 0 0 0 1
'0-'7 TOTAL 1 2 6 0 22 16
TOTAL 37 4 14 3 71 36
Sources:
(1) NAFI'A Secretariat. Status Report of Panel Proceedings, Completed NAFTA Panel Reviews,
available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index-e.aspx?DetaillD=10 (accessed June
11, 2007).
(2) NAFTA Secretariat, Status Report of Panel Proceedings, Active NAFTA Panel Reviews, available
at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index-e.aspx?DetailtD-ll (accessed June 11, 2007).
IV. CHAPTER 19 DEFECTS
A. INABILITY To APPEAL PANEL DECISIONS
Chapter 19 has a number of serious defects that negotiators must ad-
dress if we are seriously to consider its expansion. Most commentators
identify the lack of true appellate review as a serious defect in the sys-
tem.34 Initial panels exercise overwhelming power as a result of this
omission and, although their decisions are not, as with any international
dispute settlement system, binding on any issues or parties not before
them, the amounts at stake even in a single case can be quite large.
Panels are composed of ad hoc individuals who, by design, have limited
panel experience and it is common that a panelist is not expert in the
complex AD/CVD laws and regulations35. This possibility is enhanced
34. David A. Gantz, The United States and NAFTA Dispute Settlement.- Ambivalence,
Frustration, and Occasional Defiance, Univ. of Ariz. Leg. Studies Discussion Paper
No. 06-26, at 19 (on file with author).
35. Id. at 18.
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when two or three of the panelists are reviewing the result of a legal sys-
tem unfamiliar to them (a U.S. panelist reviewing a Mexican determina-
tion, for example).36 Because Chapter 19 provides no corrective
mechanism and general guidance from an appellate system, the results
can be devastating to the parties. Similar difficulty with the investor-state
dispute settlement system in NAFTFA Chapter 11 has led the Parties to
the Central America-Dominican Republic-U.S. Free Trade Agreement to
anticipate creation of an appellate review system. 37
Since negotiation of the NAFTA, the United States has seen in the
WVTO the value of a second chance when the initial panel simply has mis-
understood the issues or stubbornly stuck to a position that bodes ill for
future international trade relations. 38 Even with a steady stream of criti-
cism of the reasoning of the WTO Appellate Body, the U. S. Government
has begun to anticipate creation of appellate review systems for trade and
investment disputes. Presented, in other words, with the necessity of pro-
viding U.S. transnational investors with the protection of binding arbitral
tribunals, the U.S. Trade Representative recognizes the legally questiona-
ble, inconsistent record that has characterized Chapter 11 arbitration. A
permanent appeal mechanism will smooth that record out quickly.
B. UNCONSCIONABLE DELAYS
Cases involving the United States and Canada, for the most part, have
escaped the interminable delays that have come to characterize U.S.-
Mexico reviews of AD/CVD determinations. 39 Despite a panel deadline
of 315 days, inserted into the treaty itself for maximum effeCt40, delays
literally of years in formation of requested panels have become the norm.
Some of the delays are the result of the lack of available panelists in the
Mexican legal system 41, which has come to the AD/CVD laws substan-
tially later than its NAFTFA partners.42
36. Even though it is true that a panelist may hire a law clerk with experience in both
civilian and common law systems, few lawyers truly understand both systems. See
Richard B. Cappalli, At the Point of Decision: The Common Law's Advantage
over the Civil Law, 22 TEMPLE INT'L & Comp. L.J. 87 (1998).
37. Central America-Dominican Republic-U. S. Free Trade Agreement, art. 10.20.10,
Aug. 5, 2004, available at U.S. Trade Rep. http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-.Agreements/
Bilateral/CAF-FA/CAFTA-DRFinal-Texts/SectionIndex.html (accessed Aug. 12,
2008).
38. In addition, an appeal under Chapter 19 is limited to the question of whether the
agency decision complies with the applicable domestic law; while a WTO appeal
involves the question of whether a domestic law meets WTO requirements. See,
e.g., U.S.-Canadian Softwood Lumber, supra note 58).
39. In the Fructose Case (MEX-USA-98-1904-01), the U.S. industry's request for a
panel made a month after Mexico acted, in February 1998, was delayed for a vari-
ety of unusual trade reasons, with the result that the NAFTA panel was not even
formed until August 2000, several months after the first WTO panel to address the
issue had already issued its report finding against Mexico.
40. NAFTA art. 1904.14.
41. See Gantz, suipra note 2.
42. Another difficult issue is picking panelists who do not have an issue conflict. Most
potential panelists are practicing trade lawyers, and they may not of course serve if
they have other cases pending before the agencies with the same or similar issues.
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By far the largest cause of the delays is one Party or the other taking
the Chapter 19 process hostage to trade demands it makes of the other
Party that are unrelated to the issues involved in the NAFTA review.
Without betraying confidences, I can only note that this kind of folly has
no place whatever in a rule-based dispute settlement system. The Gov-
ernments of Mexico and the United States have not loudly condemned
the practice, but have instead condemned the merits of the other Party's
substantive position. This failure to vilify the practice of linking Chapter
19 review to other trade conflicts bespeaks a lack of respect for the pro-
cess these Governments created and a cynical view in general of the na-
ture of trade dispute settlement. In fact, one can accurately characterize
this posture as a return to the pre-WTO days when dispute settlement
was about which GATT Party had the most trade muscle, not which Party
had the superior legal argument.43
The system needs to be fixed by putting time limits on formation of a
panel by the Parties, with a default of appointment of panelists from the
Roster at random by the Secretariat. This approach is similar to the sys-
tem used by the WTO.44
C. HAS CHAPTER 19 CREATED ITS OWN BODY OF AD/CVD LAW?
Former Chief Judge Edward Re of the U.S. Court of International
Trade (CIT), whose Court lost jurisdiction over NAFTFA Party AD/CVD
challenges through Chapter 19, observed that, "[a]lthough not bound to
follow panel decisions as precedent, national courts are encouraged by
national implementing legislation to view panel decisions as persuasive
authority".45 Perhaps the reality someday will reach that objective. To
this date, at least, Judges do not cite Chapter 19 panel decisions in AD!
CVD cases. Panels have reached the position, left undecided in imple-
menting legislation, that they occupy the same litigation review level as
the CIT and thus are not bound by its prior reasoning on point. As to the
federal appellate level, panels uniformly concede the obligation to follow
the law of the federal circuit court to which interested parties may appeal
CIT (but not NAFTFA panel) decisions, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.
My own view is that the system has not fashioned a separate body of
substantive AD/CVD law, but instead that Chapter 19 panels have cre-
ated a different standard of review, at least for review of U.S. agency
action.46 U.S. agency decisions under the AD/CVD laws are subject to
43. Steven Suranovic, A Three- Year Review of the WTO, Elliott School of Interna-
tional Affairs MA Policy Capstone Exercise at http://internationalecon.com/WTO/
wto-toc.php (visited July 12, 2008).
44. WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures art. 8. See World Trade Organization, THE
WTO DISPUTE SETTfLEMENT PROCEDURES: A COLLECTION OF THE
RELEVANT LEGAL TEXTS, at 8-9 (Cambridge 2001).
45. Edward D. Re, supra note 2, at 1092.
46. In the Magnesium case (USA-CDA-00-1904-06), the Panel followed the two-stage
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in the Chevron case, 467 U.S. 873 (1984),
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the "substantial evidence" standard, that is, judicial reviewers will hold
them to be unlawful if "unsupported by substantial evidence on the re-
cord, or otherwise not in accordance with law."147 The substantial evi-
dence standard falls between the most deferential standard in U.S. law
(the agency decision will be upheld unless it is "arbitrary or capricious")
and the least deferential ("de novo" review, where the court examines the
evidence anew rather than reviewing the propriety of the agency or lower
court findings and conclusions) .48
We could describe the CIT's application of the substantial evidence
standard as the willingness to defer to the agency in close calls. Bina-
tional panels in general have applied a de novo standard, that is, they
have substituted their judgment for that of the agency when the panel
would have reached different results as to the facts or law of the case.49
This is not, of course, the "substantial evidence" standard of review that
applies to agency action in U.S. federal courts. Civilian lawyers may not
appreciate the importance of this difference, because they do not appear
to rely to any significant extent on standards of review. With their
greater reliance on a literal interpretation of the text under review, civil
law panelists rarely find the need to look to the purpose or intent of the
drafters, they analyze the laws in deductive methodology (logical reason-
ing), and the judicial precedents carry less weight for them than Common
Law lawyers. 50
Nonetheless, the CIT likely would have reached a different result in
about one-third of the cases that Court decided prior to the NAFTFA if
the standard had been the one most Chapter 19 panels are applying sub
rosa today.5'
Is there a solution to this defect, if indeed one views it as a defect? We
tried to change the mindset of panelists when the NAFTFA subsumed the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement by addition of language that en-
couraged the Parties to choose sitting or retired judges as panelists. 5 2 The
requiring that the reviewer evaluate whether the Department's statutory interpre-
tations are "sufficiently reasonable". The Panel held that the agency's antidump-
ing determinations are entitled to judicial deference. See also Lawrence L.
Herman, Making NAFTA Better: Comments on the Evolution of Chapter 19,
Center for Trade Policy and Law No 57 (2005), available at http://www.carleton.ca/
ctpl/pdf/papers/Herman-Making..NAFFA BetterMar_2005.pdf (visited July 12,
2008).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
48. Id.
49. NAFTA, In the Matter of Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico, Secreta-
riat File No. ECC-2000-1904-O1USA-the U.S. agency argued that the Binational
Panel should not conduct a de novo review of the evidence. The Extraordinary
Challenge Committee disagreed.
50. See Cappali, supra note 36, at 90.
51. Colares, Juscelino F., An Empirical Examination of Product and Litigant-Specific
Theories for the Divergence between NA FTA Chapter 19 and U.S. Judicial Review,
2d Ann. Conf. on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=997949 (visited July 12, 2008).
52. NAFTA Annex 1901.2.1 ("The roster shall include judges and former judges to the
fullest extent practicable.").
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rationale was that judges know how to apply standards of review, that is,
to be judges.53 That preference for judges was unrequited. CIT judges in
particular were unwilling to moonlight as panelists for a system that
threatened to eliminate their day jobs. Even the U.S. Supreme Court was
unwilling to encourage federal judges to participate or even clearly to
rule that doing so while still sitting would not constitute an activity incon-
sistent with their U.S. Constitution Article III judicial function. Under
these circumstances, the new language lay as a dead letter. A permanent
body of panelists would quickly gain the judicial perspective needed
properly to apply the treaty's mandated standards of review.
D. AGENCY DEFIANCE OF PANEL DECISIONS
Agencies in all parties over time have found creative ways to avoid the
effect of national court decisions. The U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
tion Service (Customs Service) may have taken these tactics to the cliff's
edge with the policy that federal district court decisions with which it dis-
agrees do not bind the Service. The rationale is that the Customs Service
is a national agency that cannot change its policy when only one of the 66
federal district courts interprets a provision. That approach did not have
particular success for the Department of Commerce. During my tenure
as Chief Counsel at that agency, a CIT Judge became frustrated with hav-
ing to remand to my clients the same ruling on the same issue in case
after case. He ordered me to appear before the Court to inform me that
if my agency did not either follow the teachings of his decisions when the
same issue arises in future cases, or promptly appeal his rulings, my
agency head should pack his toothbrush and be ready for a stay in jail for
contempt of court.
Agencies often issue decisions on remand that follow the court's or-
ders, but indicate respectful disagreement with the court's interpretation.
In such cases, an appeal of that interpretation normally follows.54 I have
not, however, witnessed the degree of defiance seen with some Chapter
19 remands. In one case, the agency publicly announced that, although it
would obey the direction given in the Panel's fifth remand, it had no in-
tention of revoking the order, even though the results of the remand
53. See, in the case of the United States, Statement of Administrative Action, The
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
644, House Doc. No. 103-159 (1993) ("There are several advantages to having
judges and former judges serve as panelists. For example, the participation of pan-
elists with judicial experience would help to ensure that, in accordance with the
requirement of Article 1904, panels review determinations of the administering
authorities precisely as would a court of the importing country by applying exclu-
sively that country's AD and CVD law and its standard of review. In addition, the
involvement of judges and former judges in the process would diminish the possi-
bility that panels and courts will develop distinct bodies of U.S. law."). At least as
to the standard of review, these words proved to be wishful thinking.
54. The facts of a particular case may make the case inappropriate for appeal, for
example, if the rule preferred by the agency would not have changed the result
under the circumstances presented, a situation the CIT Judge to whom I referred
earlier well understood.
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would be a de minimis countervailing duty margin.55
Part of the explanation for this level of rancor is the unappealable na-
ture of NAFTA panel decisions. The more direct cause stems from the
typical agency view that Chapter 19 panelists are patently unschooled in
the work of judging compliance with national law of the agency's work
product. The ad hoc ("panelist for a day") nature of AD/CVD review
sought by negotiators is the culprit here, because a permanent tribunal
likely would become in short order beneficiary only of the tension that is
typical between agencies and courts, the natural and planned result of the
constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the judi-
cial branches that is a foundation of the laws of all three NAFTFA Parties.
My friend Charlene Barshefsky 56 stated in a speech shortly before the
end of her tenure that trade dispute settlement (she was speaking specifi-
cally about the WTO) was not suited for the most important of cases. At
the time, I found the comment oddly disrespectful of systems to which
her superiors had pledged allegiance through implementing legislation.
In addition, the remark hardly could have been consoling to developing
nations, because Ambassador Barshefsky had in essence announced that
one should not expect Europe and the United States to follow WTO dis-
pute panel decisions in financially massive or otherwise critically impor-
tant cases. In other words, trade dispute settlement exists primarily to
discipline the Third World's violations of the rules.
With the benefit of time and further contemplation, I believe what Am-
bassador Barshefsky meant was that in cases of truly national importance,
neither side can afford to lose ground on major positions, regardless of
what a dispute settlement panel decides. This does not condone ignoring
panel findings. The thought does lead to an expectation that Members in
such circumstances must find politically acceptable paths to implementa-
tion of panel findings. This need may translate into substantially longer
periods for implementation in order carefully to inure constituents and
legislative bodies to the consequences of the necessary changes. The
US-FSC/DSC export tax subsidy cases are an example involving an ex-
ceptionally long period of time in which successively less WTO-inconsis-
tent legislation ultimately led to full U.S. compliance. The European
Bananas import license regime57 and its pushing aside of the 1998 Hor-
mones58 result also would fit as examples of the willingness to endure
retaliation, at least for a time, because the ruling's consequences take
55. In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final Affirma-
tive Countervailing Duty Determination from Canada, File USA-CDA-2002-1904-
03, at 8 (17 Mar 2006), available at NAFTA Secretariat website, http://www.nafta-
sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index-e.aspx?DetailID=380#USA-02-1904-03.
56. United States Trade Representative 1997-2001.
57. This regime is a 2-step process toward a tariff-only system as a solution for the
international dispute over bananas. See Charles E. Hanarahan, The U.S.-Euro-
pean Banana Dispute, CRS Report to Congress, December 9, 1999.
58. Supra note 22.
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time to become acceptable (in the case of Hormones, perhaps that time
will not come).
The defiance in Softwood Lumber59 is not unrelated to the political
reality invoked by Ambassador Barshefsky. The solution for these ac-
tions assumes that WTO and NAFTFA signatories have ceded judicial sov-
ereignty to dispute settlement panels. In the case of the WTO, despite
the never-ending monitoring by the Dispute Settlement Body of cases in
which the losing Member has not brought its laws into compliance, re-
gardless of what compensation or retaliation has occurred, 60 the Dispute
Settlement Understanding clearly leaves the ultimate decision on compli-
ance to the Member, not to the Dispute Settlement Body, unless Mem-
bers adopt a binding interpretation of or revision to the WTO Agreement
at issue.
As to NAF1TA Chapter 19, while it appears that Parties indeed ceded
ultimate judicial sovereignty as to AD/CVD determinations involving
goods of the Parties to binational panels (except for most interpretations
of the Constitutions of the Parties), Parties did not give such panels the
equity powers that would be necessary to enforce their own decisions.61 I
would not want to envision the prospect, in any event, of a Chapter 19
Marshals Service taking a Minister of Commerce into custody for her fail-
ure to implement a panel ruling. Neither the judicial nor the WTO model
seems apt for the Chapter 19 crossbreed of the two systems to prevent
agency defiance of panel decisions.62
V. EFFECTS OF FTFA DISPUTE SETFTLEMENT ON CIVIL
SOCIETY IN GENERAL
I have written elsewhere 63 that dispute settlement systems in FTFAs
promote timeliness, inclusive record keeping, and impartiality in the ad-
ministrative decisional process.
59. The United States-Canada softwood lumber dispute is one of the most significant
and enduring trade disputes in modern history. The dispute has had its biggest
effect on British Columbia, the major Canadian exporter of softwood lumber to
the United States. Softwood Lumber I (USA-CDA-2002-1904-02), Softwood Lum-
ber 11 (USA-CDA-2002- 1904-03), Softwood Lumber III (USA-CDA-2002-1904-
03), Softwood Lumber IV (USA-CDA-2002-1904-03), Softwood Lumber V (USA-
CDA-2002-1 904-03),
60. WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, art. 21.6, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
61. See Blonigen, supra note 31, at 411.
62. Some authors believe that after the lessons learned in cases as "Softwood Lum-
ber", some changes should be made in the NAFTA's chapter 19. For instance,
some people believe that establishing a permanent commission, an independent
secretariat, or even a permanent NAFTA panel would be a good idea. There are
other authors that go beyond and believe that an amendment of art. 1904.8 is nec-
essary, extending to the panel the power not only to remand but also to enforce
their own decisions. See Hermans. supra note 46.
63. Stephen J. Powell, Regional Economic Arrangements and the Rule of Law in the
Americas: The Human Rights Face of Free Trade Agreements, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L.
59, 63 (2005).
2010] EXPANDING NAFTA CHAPTER 19 SETTLEMENT 23
The fact that decisions made by national authorities affecting import-
ers and investors will often be subject to dispute settlement under an
FTA may work a substantial change in the government's decision
making process. For example, the responding Government normally
will want the dispute settlement panel to have access to the "admin-
istrative record" upon which the decision was based in order to show
compliance with the treaty provisions the complaining Government
has alleged were violated.
The fate of the agency decision will rely on the completeness of this
record in setting out the evidence relied upon and its relation to the
trade agreement's obligations. When effective dispute settlement is
available in a trade agreement, national authorities may have strong
incentives to follow a very different decisional process than previ-
ously may have been required by domestic law to implement the
agreement's obligations.
Creation of an administrative record anticipates, for example, that
evidence upon which the decision is based will be explicitly identified
and placed in the file of the measure, and mandates in addition that
the analysis made by the agency be committed to paper and assigned
to the file. It is easily seen that these steps transform the decision
process into a rules-based mechanism, rather than one that flows
from the opinions of agency officials alone, an approach that inevita-
bly ensures greater openness in the decision process for all affected
interests, both foreign and domestic.
T1he customs procedures of both MERCOSUR and the Andean Pact
provide similar encouragement for maintenance of a document retention
system by permitting challenge of an origin decision made by another
Party. Other examples abound of the benefits of dispute settlement sys-
tems to civil society in general, not only to trade interests among the
agreement's parties.
In particular, NAFTA Chapter 19 dispute settlement system benefits
civil society by facilitating accountability on several levels.
First, the review mechanism itself represents an accountability-ensur-
ing principle at the highest level, because it holds governments di-
rectly accountable to dispute settlement panels. Chapter 19 also
mandates creation of an administrative record, which directly reflects
the importance of documentation and promotes accountability. And
by requiring that decisions of dispute panels be based on the admin-
istrative record, chapter 19 exemplifies the necessity for objectivity
and accountability. Although there is no right to appeal the ruling of
a binational panel, another layer of accountability is provided. If ac-
tions of a party prevent a panel decision from being implemented, a
special committee may be formed to safeguard the integrity of the
panel process by allowing the aggrieved party to suspend operation
of the binational panel system as to the offending party. NAFTA
chapter 19 promotes accountability through an additional review
mechanism, one that allows parties to test through dispute settle-
ment whether an amendment to the anti-dumping or countervailing
3
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duty laws is consistent with WTO rules governing this trade field.64
In addition, NAFTA Chapter 19's dispute settlement system has bene-
fited civil society by increasing transparency in Mexico's AD/CVD prac-
tices.6 5 In effect, Mexico improved its standards of transparency to the
level of its NAFTFA partners in three major ways. First, the dispute settle-
ment system has allowed interested parties full participation in the ad-
ministrative process, including by requiring explicit timetables by Mexico
for its actions; requiring that the administering authority, the Secretariat
of Trade and Industrial Development (SECOFI), maintain a complete
administrative record; allowing counsel to have access to everything in
the record, including business proprietary information; and giving inter-
ested parties the opportunity to present facts and arguments in support of
their positions before decisions are made. 66 Second, the dispute settle-
ment system has required Mexico to give a full explanation of its deci-
sions, including by requiring disclosure meetings with interested parties
within seven days after preliminary and final determinations; detailed
statements of reasons and legal basis for final determinations adequate to
permit an informed decision whether to sue; and timely preparation of
summaries of ex parte meetings and of recommendations of advisory
bodies, such as the Committee on Foreign Trade Tariffs and Controls
(CACCE). 67 Finally, Chapter 19 creates full judicial review of all admin-
istrative determinations.68 Therefore, NAFTFA Chapter 19's dispute set-
tlement system has made Mexico's AD/CVD practices more transparent.
In general, the NAFIFA Chapter 19 dispute settlement system has ben-
efited civil society by promoting accountability and transparency toward
more effective participation of the people in their own governance.
VI. VIABILITY OF CHAPTER 19 AS MODEL FOR FUTURE
TRADE AGREEMENTS
A. Do ANTI-DUMPING LAWS HAVE ANY PLACE IN AN ET7A?
Perhaps the first question ought to be whether AD/CVD laws them-
selves, or at least the more-often maligned anti-dumping laws-quite
apart from any system for their review-can be justified for use within a
free trade agreement.6 9 Leaving aside the question of their economic jus-
64. Id. at 83.
65. Stephen J. Powell, Increased Transparency and Due Process in Mexico's Antidump-
ing and Countervailing Dutty Practices Under NA FTA , 653 Practising Law Institute/
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 403, 420 (Mar. 8-9, 1993).
66. Id. at 411.
67. Id. at 411-412.
68. Id. at 412.
69. Since NAFTA was negotiated in 1994, the United States has concluded free trade
agreements with: Jordan, Singapore, Chile, Australia, Morocco, The Central
American Nations and Dominican Republic, Peru, and Colombia. None of these
incorporates a Chapter 19 or similar mechanism. See USTR, Bilateral Trade
Agreements, at http://www.ustr.govrTrade-Agreements/Bilateral/SectionIndex.
html (visited Aug. 24, 2009).
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tification, competition policy officials have argued that their existence is
antithetical to the objectives of a free trade agreement because they treat
price discrimination differently when practiced by some firms within the
free trade area (those selling into the territory of another Party) than
when practiced by other firms within the free trade area (those selling to
customers within the territory of one Party).70
Without reminding our anti-trust friends that the Robinson-Patman
ACt 7 1 to this day prohibits price discrimination within the United States
under certain circumstances, I recall noting during negotiation of the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and soon thereafter that if the F1TA
succeeded in eliminating trade barriers between the two countries, arbi-
trage soon would make dumping unprofitable, with the result that the
dumping laws would wither away from disuse much as would the state in
the early Marxian view of society's transition from capitalism to social-
ism. My assumption was the classic one that a protected home market is a
necessary predicate to dumping, because selling a product back into the
home market of the dumper to reap the rewards of higher pricing there
requires that no, or few, government-imposed trade barriers exist in the
dumper's home market,72 particularly when transportation costs are un-
likely to serve as barriers for geographically-adjacent trading partners.
Even without noting the other purposes served by trade remedy laws
(escape valve for continuing trade liberalization, interface mechanism for
vastly-differing economies, and so forth), we believe this statement mis-
understands the difference in a trade agreement such as the NAFFA and
a customs union information such as the Central American Common
Market. We need not trot out the European Union to identify important
differences between an agreement whose sole purpose is the economic
one of strengthening trade among the Parties (admittedly, meeting this
objective accomplishes a political goal of making the Southernmost
NAFTFA Party substantially less subject to the great instability of sharp
currency devaluations) and an integration agreement that aims for har-
monization of external tariffs, immigration policies, treatment of workers,
financial services, and other policies, whether or not tied to trade
relations.
With regard to an integration agreement that seeks goals no loftier
than reducing trade barriers and trade conflict, I would posit that there is
70. Address by Calvin S. Goldman, then Assistant Deputy Minister for Canada's Bu-
reau of Competition Policy, in Canada/United States Law Inst. of Case Western U.
School of L., at 6 (1987).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 13. The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 is a U. S. law that prohibits
anticompetitive practices by producers, specifically price discrimination. The Act
provides for criminal penalties, but grants a specific exemption for "cooperative
associations.
72. Jacob Viner, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRA1DE 146 (Kelley
1966). See Stephen J. Powell, Antidumping Law and the United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement: Possible Next Steps, ABA Nat'l Inst. on United States/Canada
Free Trade Agreement: The Economic and Legal Implications, at 15 (Jan. 29,
1988).
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nothing "antithetical" to maintaining lawfully applied AD/CVD laws,
other than the fact that trade remedy laws are not particularly "neigh-
borly." If a company is dumping, and the WTO permits a remedy under
the circumstances of that dumping, the fact that the company is dumping
inside an economic-only free trade area rather than from outside such a
free trade area is of no moment. 73 The difficulty, of course, is in ensuring
that the "lawfully applied" aspect of my test is met by the importing
country.
We have all witnessed such blatant politicization of dumping that some
of us may be permanently cynical of those who claim to be following the
WTO rules. I have seen a WTO Member A openly threaten to impose an
AD duty on an imported product from Member B if B did not open its
market further to a product from Member A. I have seen dumping mar-
gins that coincidentally matched the level of an offered price settlement
agreement that was not accepted. I have seen affirmative injury determi-
nations that read more like a summary of foregone conclusions than an
analysis of injury indicators and trends.
Dispute settlement is available under the WTO and under regional
trade agreements, such as the NAFTA and the Andean Pact, to seek re-
dress against such outrageous abuse of AD laws. Despite the serious lim-
itation presented by the fact that these remedies are costly and time-
consuming, and their relief cannot in any event restore the parties to the
status quo ante, we believe that dispute settlement systems have substan-
tial value in preventing future flouting of WTO rules. As a participant on
both sides of the dispute panel table, I believe that claimants receive
more thorough review of their issues than they would before the typical
national court. Courts are almost universally burdened with over-
crowded dockets that markedly limit the time available and, except at the
appellate level, are normally without benefit of fellow judges to help
think through the complex issues.
B. HAS NAFTA CHAPTER 19 SURVIVED THE TEST OF TIME?
Should we view Chapter 19 as a one-time solution to Canada's insis-
tence on special treatment under the AD/CVD laws that the United
States simply could not avoid extending to Mexico? Certainly, the U.S.
Trade Representative-in fact, a series of them-has insisted emphati-
cally that Chapter 19 is ill suited for future agreements, and has pre-
vented its extension in the face of strong attempts by Chile and other
Latin American countries to join the special club of Chapter 19 benefi-
ciaries. 74 Much scholarly opinion has passed judgment on Chapter 19's
benefits and failings. I will add here my own view, aided by my perspec-
tive as both a former government official involved in Chapter 19's crea-
73. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Dumping on Free Trade: The U.S. Import Trade Laws, 64 S.
ECON. J. 402, 408 (1997).
74. See Supra note 68.
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tion, implementation, and litigation, as well as being a Chapter 19
panelist and a student of its effects.
1. More Frequent Reversal of Agency Action
For an obvious start, as would be expected with the more searching
review of an agency's record typical of any trade dispute panel,
econometric analysis shows that findings of error are more frequent than
with judicial review and some data suggest that the number of affirmative
determinations that survive the Chapter 19 process are also lower than in
the courts.75
The perception that binational panel review will be less forgiving of
agency error accounts for the well-known fact that virtually every review
of an AD/CVD determination issued by one of the NAFTFA Parties as to
merchandise of another NAF1TA Party is carried out before a Chapter 19
tribunal, not in a national court.76 In other words, if Canada's goal was to
receive special treatment under the trade remedy laws of its largest trad-
ing partner, it has resoundingly succeeded.
We may ask whether the fact that the margin of error for NAFTA AD!
CVD agencies has become so much narrower in Chapter 19 dispute set-
tlement cases than before national courts necessarily demonstrates that
these NAFTA panels could not possibly be accurately applying the
Party's statutory standard of review of agency action. The Parties have
made this claim in every challenge of Chapter 19 panel review taken
before an Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC), which is Chapter
19's pitifully inadequate version of a mechanism to prevent outlaw panel
decisions. The ECC is not an appeal, but rather a safeguard on the integ-
rity of the panel process. 77 Under NAFTA Article 1904.13(a), either
Party to a binational panel decision may appeal the decision if the Party
alleges that a member of the panel materially violated the rules of con-
duct; the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure;
or the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority, or jurisdiction. In
addition, the Party must allege that these violations materially affected
the panel's decision and threaten the integrity of the binational panel re-
view process.78 It is also important to note that, although an industry
may invoke binational panel review, only a NAFTA government may
trigger an ECC.7 9 Of the six challenges filed with the ECC, three under
75. Bruce A. Blonigen, supra note 31, at 421.
76. The author is aware that at least one law firm involved in defending U.S. exporters
against AD determinations by the Mexican Ministry of Commerce decided for a
time than amparo challenges of agency action in Mexican federal courts presented
an even higher rate of reversal of agency action and in a substantially shorter time
frame.
77. NAFTA Secretariat, Dispute Settlement, Overview of the Dispute Settlement Pro vi-
sions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NA FTA), Extraordinary Chal-
lenge Procedure, at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index-e.aspx?
DetailID=8 (accessed Aug. 12, 2008).
78. NAFTA art. 1904.13(b).
79. NAFTA art. 1905.3
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USCFTFA and three under NAFT7A, all have been unsuccessful. 80
In the first case filed under NAFTA of Gray Portland Cement, the ECC
rejected a request by the United States to convene to review one of 14
determinations made by the binational panel regarding an AD order gray
Portland cement and clinker from Mexico.8' In the subsequent case of
Pure Magnesium, the ECC rejected the challenge because the action by
the binational panel did not threaten the integrity of the binational panel
review process, even though the binational panel exceeded its power by
failing to apply the correct standard of review and such action did materi-
ally affect the panel's decision.8 Lastly, in Certain Softwood Lumber
Products, the ECC rejected arguments made by the United States that
the binational panel committed errors and held that the panel did not
manifestly exceed its powers, authority, or jurisdiction. 83 Further, the
ECC held that the panel did exceed its powers, authority, or jurisdiction
by failing to apply the appropriate standard of review on the issue of
export orientation, but the panel's failure was not material.84
Although the claim of exceeding panel authority by failing to follow
the appropriate standard of review of agency action has been found with-
out merit by every ECC, one must wonder whether more searching scru-
tiny of the record alone possibly can account for the data on the greater
frequency of panel remands to correct error.
2. Ad Hoc Panel Membership
In addition to the expanded time for typical trade dispute settlement as
compared with that available to judges in national courts, another impor-
tant contributor to the greater reversal rate is the ad hoc nature of panel
membership. Primarily because of the U.S. position that permanent
trade tribunals would become isolated islands of trade law interpretation
uninformed by the real trade world of negotiating compromise and prac-
tical solutions, panelists are ad hoc, appointed only for the time needed to
complete their work on the panel to which appointed, then they are sent
back to their day job to soak up even more of that practical approach to
80. NAFTA, In Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Secreta-
riat File No. ECC-2004-1904-O1USA, at 67-68 (Aug. 10, 2005); NAFTA, In Matter
of Pure Magnesium from Canada, Secretariat File No. ECC-2003-1904-O1USA, at
11 (Oct. 5, 2004); NAFTA, In Matter of Gray Portland, Cement and Clinker from
Mexico, Secretariat File No. ECC-2000-1904-O1USA, at 7 (Oct. 30, 2003);
USCFTA, In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, FCC-
94-1904-OlUSA, at 51-52 (Aug. 3, 1994); USCFTA, In the Matter of Live Swine
from Canada, FCC No. 1993-1904-OlUSA, at 18 (Apr. 8, 1993); USCFTA, In the
Matter of Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, ECC No. 1991-1904-
OlUSA, at 19 (June 14, 1991).
81. Parallel Proceeding at the WTO and Under NAFTA Chapter 19: Whither the Doc-
trine of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in DSU Reform?, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv 47 (2007).
82. NAFTA, In the Matter of Pure Magnesium from Canada, at 11, FCC No. 2003-
1904-OIUSA (Oct. 5, 2004).
83. NAFTA, In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, at 67,
ECC No. 2004-1904-01USA (Aug. 10, 2005).
84. Id. at 67-68.
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solving problems in the real world.85 In my experience, the effect has
been that the very rarity of panel service virtually ensures that panelists
will not view their panel duties simply as another day at the office-as
would a national court judge-but as a singular event in which they have
been chosen to participate by reason of their special expertise. With the
expanded time to delve into the record and, in the case of NAFTFA Chap-
ter 19, your very own research assistant, this view translates into an obli-
gation to ensure to a high level of certainty that the proper interpretation
of applicable law has been reached. Very few agency records will avoid
sunburn under this kind of blistering light.
3. Majority Rule?
NAFTA dispute settlement in one way is similar to commercial arbitra-
tion in that each of the Parties selects two of its five judges, with the chair
chosen normally by the Party that wins a coin toss. Because Parties have
to date always selected their own citizens from the Roster of Chapter 19
Panelists, this procedure for establishing a panel results in a five-person
panel with a majority from one Party.816 In the early days, my unofficial
counts found that the victorious Party was predictable simply by noting
which Party had a majority. Early panelists "voted the flag," and in the
most contentious of cases, for example, Softwood Lumber, one could al-
most remark that a panelist need not come home if she did not vote with
her Government's position.
Because Chapter 19 cases have become, if not routine, at least com-
mon, Parties no longer may rely on the votes of their nationals if the
position of the Party will not withstand scrutiny. For example, in both of
the NAFIFA Panels on which I have served, the majority has been of
mixed nationality, in one case unanimous. I recognize that the Govern-
ments of the Parties do not always have a position in particular cases, for
example, when producers of one Party are challenging a determination by
another Party, but I believe my observation remains valid that nationality
of a panelist will not be a deciding factor in all but the closest of legal
arguments. Even the massive cases such as Softwood Lumber bear out
this observation.
C. ON BALANCE, PERHAPS CHAPTER 19 DOES HAVE A FUTURE
Every free trade agreement negotiated by the United States, beginning
with the Israel-U.S. F1TA in 1985 and extending to the Colombia-U.S.
1IFA in 2006, as well as MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact, the Caribbean
Community, the Central American Common Market, and many other
trade agreements in the Hemisphere, provide for interpretation of the
agreements and resolution of conflicts by dispute panel bodies. In the
United States, this plethora of dispute settlement bodies likely will lead
85. Gantz, supra note 34, at 18.
86. Id.
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to establishment of a single roster of eligible experts from all nations for
service on any panel established.
The cost of these systems will be substantial. Even in the case of the
NAFT'A, governments sometimes have delayed payment of panelists for
years because of failure of the Parties to allocate sufficient funds to the
process. Expanding the system to the thirty-four democratic countries in
the Hemisphere would require funds far beyond present plans of any of
these nations. If the Parties can succeed in a practical funding arrange-
ment, I see nothing antithetical to the trade agreements involved to have
a single dispute settlement system, operating under a common set of rules
to reach the decision called for by the particular agreement, using the
laws and the standard of review there provided. In fact, a common dis-
pute settlement system would actually be the easiest part of a Free Trade
Area of the Americas to conclude.
This does not address whether AD/CVD determinations of other Hem-
ispheric countries should be subject to dispute settlement in the manner
envisioned by NAFTA Chapter 19. I was not while a Government em-
ployee much of a fan of NAF TA panels. Start-up problems were major,
and we had in place a perfectly useful system of judicial review that, in
my view, did not need fixing. Having now served on NAF TA panels, and
observed the decisions reached in the variety of situations presented over
the past twenty-two years of Chapter 19's existence in the U.S-Canada
and NAFTA agreements, I believe the system has been no better, and no
worse, than the national courts it replaced.
If the United States, as is likely, will not condone major substantive
changes to its AD/CVD laws, which will, once agriculture issues are
solved in the Doha Round, become the final sticking point for reaching
agreement, then changing the method of review of AD/CVD determina-
tions may furnish a missing piece in the puzzle of FTAA negotiations.
Although Brazil's officials may at first glance see nothing in a Chapter 19
process that addresses their substantive AD/CVD conflicts with the
United States as orange juice, steel, and other Brazilian exports, further
reflection may reveal that Chapter 19 has demonstrated yet again what
good lawyers already know, that procedure can become substance in the
twinkle of an eye.
